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Why We Can't Be Friends: Quakers, Hobby
Lobby, and the Selective Protection of
Free Exercise
Zachary A. Albunt
Introduction
Members of the Religious Society of Friends, commonly
known as Quakers, have long sought exemptions from martial
legal obligations because of their faith's pacifist "Peace
Testimony."1 In the United States, at least since the advent of the
federal income tax, neither the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment nor any independent congressional statute has
protected theo-pacifist refusal to pay taxes in support of the
military or of specific military endeavors.2 In the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
(Hobby Lobby),3 some Quakers have argued that such tax
resistance now has a legal basis.4 However, both the majority and
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1. See, e.g., GEORGE FOX, THE JOURNAL OF GEORGE FOX 398-403 (John L.
Nickalls ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1952) (1694) (quoting "A Declaration from the
Harmless and Innocent People of God, Called Quakers, 'Against All Plotters and
Fighters in the World"' addressed to Charles II by George Fox and eleven other
Quakers, Jan. 21, 1661); see also MARGARET E. HIRST, THE QUAKERS IN PEACE AND
WAR
194-224
(1923),
https://archive.org/details/quakersinpeacewaOOhirsuoft
(tracing the development of the Peace Testimony through various eighteenthcentury wars); David Harding, Quaker Tax Protesters Challenge Law, ACCT. AGE
(Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/analysis/1763122/quaker-taxprotesters-challenge-law (discussing the refusal by modern-day Quakers to pay
taxes in the United Kingdom).
2. See Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Phila.
Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends (Yearly Meeting 1), 753 F. Supp.
1300, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)
(stating the proposition in dicta).
3. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
4. See, e.g., MManion, If Quakers Had Petitioned the Supreme's, DAILY Kos
(July 03, 2014, 11:20 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/07/03/1311529/-IfQuakers-Had-Petitioned-the-Supreme-s (questioning why the Court's logic did not
extend to pacifist tax resistance); Sarah Ruden, Scalia's Major Screw-up: How
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dissent in Hobby Lobby took great pains to specify that the
decision should not apply to "tax cases."' This Note will argue that
the majority and dissent both erred in this respect. Specifically,
this Note will argue that the tax theory of mandates in National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB)6 and the
Court's expansive reading of the "least restrictive means" test in
Hobby Lobby7 effectively vitiate the government's ability to
override religious beliefs.' Thus, if the issue of Quaker theopacifist resistance to income taxes recurs, the Court should
recognize that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA)9 abrogated and superseded United States v. Lee" and
Adams v. Commissioner." However, the miniscule likelihood that
this would actually occur12 points to a fundamental-and arguably
unconstitutional1 3-inequity in the Court's present jurisprudence:
privileging certain religious beliefs, such as opposition to birth
control, over others, such as pacifism.
Part I of this Note begins with a review of the political
history of Quaker theo-pacifism, with an eye towards the United
States' eventual abandonment of accommodations in its

SCOTUS Just Gave Liberals a Huge Gift, SALON (July 14, 2014, 3:45 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/O7/14/scalias-major-screw up-how-scotusjust gave-li
berals a huge-gift/ (arguing that Hobby Lobby would protect pacifist Quakers from
income tax liability).
5. Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784 ("[It is] untenable to allow
individuals to seek exemptions from taxes based on religious objections to
particular Government expenditures."), with id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(reiterating that Lee, 455 U.S. 252, is "a tax case" and turns on the particularities
of a national system of taxation, but noting that "the Lee Court made two key
points one cannot confine to tax cases").
6. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
7. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-81 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (citing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1)).
8. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that state laws
criminalizing peyote, including sacramental peyote, did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause because those laws were facially neutral); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that government interest in Social Security trumped
an Amish employer's religious objections to Social Security taxes).
9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-12000bb-4 (2012).
10. Lee, 455 U.S. 252.
11. Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
12. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784 (discussing Lee's holding with approval
and stating that Lee and Hobby Lobby are "quite different").
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (guaranteeing equal protection under
the law); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (ruling that the Equal
Protection Clause applies to the federal government via the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment).
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generalized tax schemes. Part I then discusses Quakers' collective
response to this abandonment through legislative initiatives
including the Peace Tax Fund. Part II discusses the development
of the First Amendment free-exercise doctrine in the mid-to-late
twentieth century that led to Congress's adoption of RFRA in
1993. Part II also chronicles litigation concerning Quaker theopacifist tax resistance to illustrate how the adjudication of such
claims has closely mimicked broader developments in free-exercise
and RFRA doctrines. Finally, Part II demonstrates how Lee, a
case concerning an Amish individual with a religious objection to
Social Security, came to control Quaker tax-resistance cases. Part
III discusses the Supreme Court's extremely controversial Hobby
Lobby decision in light of its equally controversial decision in
NFIB the prior year. Part III juxtaposes these two cases in order
to highlight the implicit distinction the Hobby Lobby court draws
between "tax" and "non-tax" cases. Part IV uses close reading and
statutory interpretation to show that the distinction described in
Part III is a false one and that provisions designated by Congress
as "taxes," including the federal income tax, are wholly subject to
Hobby Lobby's precedential weight. Part V seeks to transcend the
Court's false dichotomy and apply the Hobby Lobby holding to
hypothetically re-litigated cases involving religious objections to
Social Security and income tax provisions. Part V also contrasts
its own conclusions with on-point, but utterly contrary, portions of
Hobby Lobby's dicta.
Part VI reflects upon the discrepancy
between Hobby Lobby's dicta and its substantive analysis and
concludes that the case's internal contradiction is likely a
symptom of the Court's disregard for equal protection principles in
this context. But before attempting to understand "why we can't
be Friends,"14 it is important to understand who the Friends are.
I.

Background on Quaker Resistance to Taxation
A.

Early History

The origins of the Quakers' pacifist "Peace Testimony" date to
the founding of the sect, also known as the Society of Friends, or
"Friends,'"" by George Fox in the mid-seventeenth century. 6 The

14. See WAR, Why Can't We Be Friends?, on WHY CAN'T WE BE FRIENDS?
(United Artists Records 1975).
15. See, e.g., Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgement, United States v. Phila. Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y
of Friends (Yearly Meeting II), 322 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (No. 03-CV4254), 2004 WL 3693418 (referring to Quakers and Friends interchangeably).
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Peace Testimony directs Quakers to uniformly avoid supporting
violence, since "all outward wars and strife" are considered
contrary to Christian teaching.17
The Testimony has broad
applications, as Friends are directed to "beware of supporting
preparations for war even indirectly."18
As early as 1755, a delegation of Quakers went to the
Pennsylvania Assembly to warn lawmakers that they would not be
able to comply with a tax that had been proposed to finance the
Crown's military efforts in the French and Indian War. 9 Later,
during the U.S. Civil War, Congress accommodated the religious
objections of some Quakers by providing that the commutation fee,
which was levied in the instance of absent tax payments, would be
used to finance humanitarian projects: namely, the care of sick or
wounded soldiers." Eventually, Congress ceased its practice of
assessing special "war taxes" to pay for periodic military
expenditures and began financing the military through a
generalized income tax.21 However, many Quakers adhered to
their pacifist principles and withheld funds, often doing so in
proportion to their calculation of the military budget.
This
triggered a series of lawsuits that challenged the constitutionality
of the taxation, as well as the constitutionality of the various
penalties flowing from such resistance. 3 Though free-exercise

16. See id.
17. FOX, supra note 1, at 399.
18. Brief for New York Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Packard v. United States, 529 U.S. 1068
(2000) (No. 99-1391), 2000 WL 34015023.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, sec. 17, 13 Stat. 6,9; see Brief for New York
Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 18, at 13.
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. But see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For God and
Country: Taxing Conscience, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 939, 954 (discussing continued theopacifist nonparticipation in voluntary war finance schemes, such as war bonds,
throughout the twentieth century).
22. See Jenney v. United States, 755 F.2d 1384, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985).
23. See, e.g., U.S. Sues Quaker Group over Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/us/us-sues-quaker-group-over-taxes.html
(discussing one such lawsuit); see also Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir.
1999) (discussing the constitutionality of such taxation in general); id. at 180
(discussing the constitutionality of the penalties for failure to pay such taxes).
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doctrine evolved substantially over the course of the twentieth
century,24 courts remain averse to allowing objections to income
taxation based on religious freedom. 5
B. A Modern Response: The Peace Tax Fund
Throughout the twentieth century, Quakers joined with other
pacifist groups in proposing legislation to segregate their tax
receipts into a non-military "Peace Tax Fund" that would enable
pacifists to behave consistently with both their religious principles
and the law. 6 In 1961, a group of Friends drafted a bill to divert
conscientious objectors' tax receipts to the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF).2
Notably, the bill proposed
publicizing those who opted into the diversion program, as well as
increasing their individual tax liability by five percent in order to
discourage insincere use of the provision.2 ' Each year from 1972 to
1999, some new version of the Peace Tax Fund proposal was
introduced in Congress.2 9 The concept of a Peace Tax Fund proved
popular among Quakers, and some Friends even sought to place
portions of their tax receipts in escrow subject to the
establishment of a Peace Tax Fund.30
On June 25, 2013, Representative John Lewis introduced the
113th Congress's version of the Peace Tax Fund. 31 The bill
directed the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a segregated
Treasury account for the deposit of all monies "paid by or on behalf

24. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (2014)
(positing that the purpose of enacting RFRA in 1993 was to "restore the compelling
interest test" announced in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) ("The tax system
could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge it because tax
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief."); see also
Yearly Meeting 11, 322 F. Supp. 2d 603, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (ruling that wage
garnishment is the "least restrictive means" of effectuating the compelling state
interest in recovering funds unpaid because of theo-pacifist protest).
26. See Kornhauser, supra note 21, at 985; see also Miscellaneous Tax Bills and
Peace Tax Fund: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong. 128-30 (1992) (quoting testimony by
Elenora Giddings Ivory, Director of the Washington Office of the Presbyterian
Church, supporting the establishment of a Peace Tax Fund).
27. Kornhauser, supra note 21, at 986 (citations omitted).
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Jenney v. United States, 755 F.2d 1384, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the individual income tax return of a couple who purported to hold a
portion of their tax receipts in escrow due to their conscientious objection to war
was a frivolous tax return that exposed the couple to civil penalties).
31. See H.R. 2483, 113th Cong. (2013).
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of taxpayers who are designated conscientious objectors., 32 The
bill neither required the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to
segregate the portion of an objector's tax payment that would go to
military purposes nor designated how the monies collected should
be allocated, other than to a "nonmilitary purpose. 33 Further, the
bill would not have affected the federal government's ability to
''replace" the lost funds by proportionally over-allocating money to
3 4
military purposes from nonparticipating individuals' tax receipts.
In this respect, the bill compares to other accommodations that
apply to Quakers, such as the allowance for conscientious
5
objections 3to
However, the bill died in
6 the selective service.
committee.
II. Free Exercise Between Sherbert and RFRA
A.

The Initial Compelling Interest Test

Protection of free exercise of religion originates in the First
Amendment.37 Contemporary free-exercise jurisprudence flows
largely from Sherbert v. Verner' and Wisconsin v. Yoder. 9 Per
these two cases, the balancing test for free exercise depends on two
factors: (1) whether a given government action "substantially
burdens" the party's free exercise of religion, and, (2) if it does,
whether government action is necessary to advance a compelling

32. Id. § 4.
33. See H.R. 2483.
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2812-13 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547,
556 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that a conscientious objector to the draft is unable to
prevent the government from drafting someone else in his place).
36. See Congressional Research Service, H.R. 2483: Religious Freedom Peace
Tax Fund Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bil/l13thcongress/house-bill/2483 (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 252 (1982).
But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761-62 (2014)
(stating that Congress, in passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-5(7)(A), created an independent statutory
right and "effect[ed] a complete separation from First Amendment case law").
38. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963) (holding that South Carolina
could not deny unemployment compensation to a claimant who refused
employment because her religious beliefs would not allow her to work on
Saturdays).
39. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972) (holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state from requiring Amish parents to go
against Amish religious tenets and enroll their children, who had graduated eighth
grade, in formal high school).
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government interest.40 However, beginning in the 1980s, the Court
somewhat backtracked on
41 free-exercise protections by limiting the
use of the Sherbert test.
In Lee, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not
allow an Amish employer to refrain both from withholding social
security taxes and from receiving Social Security benefits for
himself and his employees. 42 Specifically, the Court did not allow
the plaintiff, an employer, to opt into a statutory exception to
Social
Security
for self-employed Amish because
"the
Government's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous
participation in and contribution to the social security system is
very high, 43 and because "[t]he tax system could not function if
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because
tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious
belief"' 44 Lee has enormous implications for both Quaker tax
resistance and the Hobby Lobby case. 4 In both Lee and Hobby
Lobby, an employer cited personal religious objections to a
statutory obligation and sought eligibility for a previously
established exemption from that obligation. 46 Further, in both
cases an employer's religious practices undermined the ability of
employees to receive the benefits of a statutorily mandated
program. 4'74 However, in Lee, unlike in Hobby Lobby,48 the Court
held that the compelling government interest in the program
outweighed the employer's free-exercise rights.49

40. See infra Part III.
41. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-84 (1990) (limiting
application of the Sherbert test to "the unemployment compensation field"); Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706-08 (1986) (declining to apply Sherbert). But see, e.g.,
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-19 (1980)
(applying Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04, to hold that Indiana's purported interests
were not "sufficiently compelling to justify the burden upon [the plaintiffs]
religious liberty").
42. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
43. Id. at 258-59.
44. Id. at 260.
45. See id. ("If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a
certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related
activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from
paying that percentage of the income tax.").
46. Compare Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763-64
(2014) (discussing the existence of, eligibility criteria for, and exemptions to the
Affordable Care Act's (ACA) "contraceptive mandate," 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a), (b)),
with Lee, 455 U.S. at 255-56 (discussing the statutory exemption for Social
Security, 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g), for self-employed Amish persons).
47. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 2780 (majority opinion).
49. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
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B. Abandonment in Smith, Overcompensation in RFRA?
1.

Smith Sets the Stage

Free-exercise protection arguably reached its nadir in
Employment Division v. Smith." Justice Scalia's majority opinion
in that case stated that the Sherbert test should only be used for
employment-compensation questions and should not apply to
"religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a
particular religious practice.""
Thus, such laws were per se
constitutional with respect to free exercise."2 Accordingly, the
Court held that an Oregon law uniformly attaching criminal
liability to the possession and consumption of peyote, and the
state's subsequent denial of unemployment compensation to an
individual who violated the law as part of a religious ceremony,
did not violate free-exercise protections. 3
In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Scalia drew largely from pre-Sherbert common
law. 4 Smith seemed to reflect Justice Steven's Lee concurrence
more so than Lee's eight-justice majority opinion.5
Justice
O'Connor's Smith concurrence, joined in part by the case's
dissenting Justices, more closely resembles the Lee majority's
interpretation of Yoder and Sherbert,6 as well as subsequent

50. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512
(1997) (stating that Congress "enacted RFRA in direct response" to Smith). But see
Ren6 Reyes, The FadingFree Exercise Clause, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 737
(2010) ("The nadir of the Free Exercise Clause was reached in [Christian Legal
Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010)]."). Reyes's proposition seems doubtful
because the exercise in question in Martinez took place in the context of a public
university, see Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 667-68 (2010),
rather than in private religious observance, as in Smith. 494 U.S. at 874.
51. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 890.
54. E.g., id. at 879 ("Conscientious scruples have not ... relieved the individual
from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of
religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the
relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities." (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940))), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
55. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("In my opinion, it is the objector who must shoulder the burden of demonstrating
that there is a unique reason for allowing him a special exemption from a valid law
of general applicability.").
56. See id. at 257 (majority opinion) ("The state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding
governmental interest." (citations omitted)).
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developments in religious freedom law,57 by emphasizing the
balancing of compelling government interests with the burdens on
individual exercise:
In my view, however, the essence of a free exercise claim is
relief from a burden imposed by government on religious
practices or beliefs, whether the burden is imposed directly
through laws that prohibit or compel specific religious
practices, or indirectly through laws that, in effect, make
abandonment of one's own religion or conformity to the
religious beliefs of others the price of an equal place in the
civil community.58

A few months after Smith, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided United States v.
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends
5
(Yearly Meeting 1).
1
Per Smith, the court held that war-tax
resisters had no constitutional argument negating their income

tax liability, because the income tax was a religion-neutral law
that had the collateral effect of burdening religion.0 So long as
Smith's "animus/neutrality" theory of free exercise prevailed,
Quaker resistance to taxation remained a legally hopeless
endeavor.61
2.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Congress passed RFRA in response to Smith and its ilk. 2 As
stated in the Senate report, the purpose of the act was to overturn
Smith and to "restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert... and... Yoder. ..."" Unlike the holdings in those
cases, which required that the government only show a
''compelling state interest" in order to potentially infringe on free
exercise,6 4 the text of RFRA requires both a showing that the
6 '5
action is "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest

57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (2012).
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 897 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. See Yearly Meeting I, 753 F. Supp. 1300, 1302-03 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
60. Id. at 1303-04.
61. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Cnty. of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253, 1260-61 (S.D.
Mich. 1990) (dismissing plaintiffs claims on summary judgment based on Smith).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014) ("Congress responded to Smith by
enacting RFRA.").
63. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. See id. (discussing the test as applied in Sherbert and Yoder).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(1) (2012); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767
("By enacting RFRA, Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is
constitutionally required." (citations omitted)).
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66
and that it is the "least restrictive means" to further that interest.
By imposing a uniform review of whether or not a given law
"substantially burdens" a religious exercise, RFRA can be
understood as a rejection of Justice Scalia's theory in Smith that,
in order to violate the Free Exercise Clause, a law must derive
from an anti-religious animus, either against a specific religion or
religion in general.
In requiring courts to uniformly evaluate
whether facially neutral laws have indirectly burdened sincerely
held religious beliefs, Congress essentially displaced Justice
Scalia's Smith opinion with Justice O'Connor's
Smith
681
concurrence.
Following RFRA's passage, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals heard Adams v. Commissioner. In that case, a Quaker,
Priscilla Adams, raised free-exercise objections to both her tax
liability in support of military expenditures and the corresponding
penalties for her failure to pay.7" The Adams court held that the
income tax substantially burdened Adams's free exercise, but it
also found that "[lt]he least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling interest in the collection of taxes ... is in fact, to
implement that system in a uniform, mandatory way, with
Congress determining in the first instance if exemptions
are ... built into the legislative scheme." 1 Therefore, according to
the court, Adams had no free-exercise basis for exemption. 2 The
difference in reasoning between Adams and Yearly Meeting I
reflects RFRA's revision of Smith.13 Indeed, district courts reached
parallel conclusions in Packard v. United States14 and in United
States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of
Friends (Yearly Meeting 11)."7

66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(2); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
67. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) ("It is difficult to maintain
that [such laws] are examples of legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or
hostility to the burdened religious practices or that they indicate some widespread
pattern of religious discrimination in this country.").
68. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 897 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
69. 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
70. Id. at 174-75.
71. Id. at 179.
72. Id. at 180.

73. See Yearly Meeting I, 753 F. Supp. 1300, 1302-03 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
74. See Packard v. United States, 7 F. Supp. 2d 143, 145 (D. Conn. 1998), aff'd,
198 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff, who claimed she was
entitled to have her penalty fees returned after she refused to pay a tax for
religious reasons, failed to make a claim under 26 U.S.C. § 6651).
75. See Yearly Meeting II, 322 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding
that RFRA did not exempt the defendant Quaker group "from honoring the [IRS]
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III. NFIB and Hobby Lobby
A. An Introduction to Hobby Lobby
On the final day of its 2012 October Term, the Supreme
Court issued one of its most controversial decisions in recent
memory,76 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc." Hobby Lobby
concerned a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) 8 that required participating employers' group
health plans to provide coverage for twenty contraceptive methods
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), including
"four... [that] may have the effect of preventing an already
fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting its
attachment to the uterus." 9 After the ACA's passage, employers
in the form of closely held, for-profit, private corporations sought
preliminary injunctions against tax penalties for providing healthcare coverage minus the contraceptives at issue.
In Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, the Third Circuit held as a threshold
matter that such employers could not assert free-exercise rights.81
However, in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, the Tenth
Circuit ruled not only that such employers could assert free-

levy" on an employee's salary, but noting that the group was not liable for a fifty
percent penalty due to a dispute over the "legal effectiveness of the levy" (quoting
26 C.F.R. § 301.6332-1(b)(2))).
76. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Defeat of the ContraceptionMandate in Hobby
Lobby, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 35 ("Burwell v. Hobby Lobby is this year's most
controversial Supreme Court decision.").
77. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
78. Id. at 2761.
79. Id. at 2762-63. But see Robin Abcarian, The Craziest Thing About the
Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby Decision, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-ra-craziest-thing-about-hobby-lobby20140630-column.html (discussing scientific literature stating that those four
drugs do not cause abortion).
80. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765; see also 26 U.S.C. § 4980D (2012)
(detailing the repercussions for noncompliance with the Health Resources and
Service Administration's (HRSA) determinations for "group health plan
requirements"); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (requiring participating
employers to cover "preventative care and screenings ... with respect to women" as
a distinct group); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2014) (empowering HRSA, an
agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to determine
the forms of preventative care and the screenings that employers must cover for
women).
81. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't. of Health and
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 382-83, 389 (3d Cir. 2013), overruled by Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
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exercise rights,82 but that RFRA precluded enforcement of the ACA
with respect to the contraceptive mandate.83 The Supreme
Court
8 4
consolidated review of the two cases to decide the matter.
The Court's majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito,'
affirmed the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, including its holding"6 that the ACA's contraceptive
mandate was not the "least restrictive" means to accomplish the
''compelling governmental interest" of providing the contraceptive
methods in question to the public.87 The government contended
that the issue fell under the purview of Lee, but Justice Alito's
majority opinion rejected this argument because the "holding in
Lee," like that of Adams, "turned primarily on the special problems
associated with a national system of taxation.""" It approvingly
quoted Lee's dicta that "[lt]he tax system could not function if
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because
tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious
belief." 9
In a narrow sense, this proposition was corroborated by the
dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, emphasized that Lee "was a tax case and
the court in Lee homed in on '[t]he difficulty in attempting to
accommodate religious beliefs in the area of taxation, '''90 but that
the majority erred in "dismiss[ing] Lee as a tax case" because
"[lt]he Lee Court made.., points one cannot confine to tax cases."9'1
The dissent characterized the majority as "hold[ing] that
commercial enterprises.., can opt out of any law (saving only tax
laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious
beliefs."9'2 Thus, while the dissent argued that Lee ought to guide
the Court's Hobby Lobby decision, it suggested that Lee made

82. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
83. Id. at 1146-47.
84. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2764-67.
85. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2758.
86. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1147.
87. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2780-81 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1).
88. Id. at 2784.
89. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260
(1981)).
90. Id. at 2803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 259 (1981)).
91. Id. at 2804 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 2787.
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several holdings that one could confine to tax cases. Taken in
context, this amounted to an admission that the government
interest at issue in Lee was not analogous to the government's
interest in administering the ACA's contraceptive mandate, with
its remedial taxes for noncompliance.93
Elsewhere, the majority opinion referred to these potential
consequences of the employer's noncompliance with the relevant
provisions of the ACA:
If the companies continue to offer group health plans that do
not cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be taxed $100
per day for each affected individual .... For Hobby Lobby the
bill could amount to $1.3 million per day or about $475 million
per year. 94
The majority contrasted this outcome with another strategy that
employers might use to avoid financing contraception: "dropping
insurance coverage altogether" and causing their employees to
seek coverage through one of the ACA's statutory health insurance
exchanges. 9 In this instance, the "penalties would amount to
roughly $26 million for Hobby Lobby."9'6 The majority's careful
deference to the distinction drawn between the punitive "tax"
under 26 U.S.C. § 4980D and the punitive "penalty" under 26
U.S.C. § 4980H is undoubtedly a consequence of the Court's
landmark ruling-or, more accurately, one of the Court's landmark
rulings 7-in NFIB.98
B.

The Basis for the Tax Distinction in NFIB

NFIB concerned several provisions of the ACA, including the
constitutionality
of the
Act's
requirement that
"most
Americans... maintain 'minimum essential' health insurance
coverage. '" 9 The individual mandate imposes, subject to statutory
exemptions,0 0 a "penalty" for failure to get minimum health
insurance coverage.0
Congress's classification of the remedial

93. See id. at 2803-04.
94. Id. at 2775-76 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing 26 U.S.C.

§ 4980D).
95. Id. at 2776.
96. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H).
97. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Chief Justice Roberts's Marbury Moment:
The Affordable Care Act Case (NFIB v. Sebelius), 13 WYO. L. REV. 335, 335-46
(2013) (discussing NFIB's holdings with respect to the federal government's
commerce, spending, and taxing powers).
98. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
99. Id. at 2571 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
100. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e) (2012).
101. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(b) (2012).
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measure as a "penalty" rather than as a "tax" has nuanced and
somewhat confounding implications for Chief Justice Roberts's
majority opinion.
In brief, NFIB held that Congress, in labeling the individual
mandate's punitive measure a "penalty," precluded it from being
treated as a tax for the purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act." 2
According to the Court, the determination of how "creatures of
Congress's own creation ... relate to each other is up to
Congress. 1 3 The Court explicitly stated that this ruling was
confined to the realm of statutory interpretation.1 0 4 Thus, the
majority held that, because the individual mandate functionally
operated as a tax, the mandate was cognizable as a tax for the
purposes of constitutional, but not statutory, classification.0 5 The
majority conceded that the individual mandate is regulatory and
aimed at the promotion of particular individual conduct.10 6 Still, it
held that the mandate is not a "penalty," because that term
"means punishment for an unlawful act or omission, ' 107 and the
ACA "need not be read to declare that failing to [purchase health
insurance] is unlawful."1 8
RFRA is a statutory, rather than constitutional, provision,0 o9
and the remedial measures at issue in Hobby Lobby are labeled as
taxes within their statutory framework.10 Thus, it follows from
NFIB that the remedial fines for failure to provide complete
coverage should, as a general proposition, be considered tax
provisions for the purposes of RFRA."'
Justice Alito did not
102. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (discussing the inapplicability of the AntiInjunction Act to the controversy as issue).
103. Id.

104. See id. ("It is true that Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax
or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the
other.").
105. Id. at 2595.
106. Id. at 2596.

107. Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 2597.

109. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2756 (2014) ("[I]f
RFRA's original text were not clear enough, the RLUIPA amendment surely dispels
any doubt that Congress intended to separate ... [it] from that in First
Amendment case law.").
110. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980D (2012).
111. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583. But see Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3d 1114, 1127 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding that the remedial
provisions were not a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). However, NFIB analyzed
whether 26 U.S.C. § 4980D ought to be treated as a tax for the specific purposes of
the Anti-Injunction Act, and did not use it for general statutory interpretation.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583.
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address
the tax/penalty dichotomy in his majority Hobby Lobby
S - 112
However, the Tenth Circuit opinion in that case
opinion.
explicitly characterized the tax articulated in 26 U.S.C. § 4980D as
"no more than a penalty for violating regulations related to health
Thus, the Tenth
care and employer-provided insurance."113
Circuit's holding suggests some tension between NFIB and Hobby
Lobby as to how to classify statutorily defined taxes with respect
to other statutes.1
C. Hobby Lobby Outside the Tax Issue
Neither Justice Alito's majority nor Justice Ginsburg's
dissent in Hobby Lobby limited analysis of Lee to the formal
question of whether or not it applies as a "tax case." ' Turning
first to the issue of RFRA's breadth, the Court ruled that the least
restrictive means test that the statute imposes on the federal
government goes "far beyond" the constitutional protections for
free exercise that the Court had previously articulated. 16 Still, the
majority affirmed the outcome in Lee, stating:
[I]f the issue in Lee were analyzed under RFRA framework,
the fundamental point would be that there is simply no less
restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay
taxes.... [T]he contraceptive mandate is very different. ACA
does not create a large national pool of tax revenue for use in
purchasing healthcare coverage.
Subsequently, the Court rejected the government's contention
that imposing the contraceptive mandate on closely held
corporations was essential to the ACA's statutory scheme.1
Instead, the Court ruled that the government had not
demonstrated that the regulation was the "least restrictive" way to
accomplish the compelling government interest of providing access

112. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759-85.
113. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1127-28 (emphasis added) (comparing the
identical construction of the "penalty" HHS can impose on non-compliant insurers
under 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(b)(2)(C)(i) with the "tax" imposed on non-compliant
employers under 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1), and noting that other potential
consequences of employer noncompliance are categorized as "penalties"); see also id.
at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (referring to § 4980D's provisions as "crippling
penalties").
114. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583 ("Where Congress uses certain language in one
part of a statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally.").
115. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2784 (2014); id. at
2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (majority opinion).
117. Id. at 2784 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 2782.
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to the birth control at issue.19 The "less restrictive" means
proposed by the majority included: (1) having the government
directly purchase the contraceptives for any woman unable to
attain them through private insurance, or (2) making closely held
for-profit corporations eligible for the contraceptive mandate's optout provision already available to self-certified religious nonprofits
under 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(4).12 0 The Court added that it saw no
legal reason that prevented it from ruling
that RFRA required the
2
1
creation of a new government program.
This final ruling, in particular, begs the question of how the
Court might handle an argument that RFRA requires Congress to
adjust income tax laws to include the Peace Tax Fund or
something similar. However, this is not the only inconsistency
between Hobby Lobby's substantive ruling and its treatment of
Lee.
For instance, it is worth considering whether the
contraceptive mandate's statutory punitive mechanism, 26 U.S.C.
§ 4980D, is actually a tax, and therefore whether Justice Alito
draws a false distinction between "tax cases," such as Lee, and
non-tax cases, such as Hobby Lobby.
IV. Is Hobby Lobby a Tax Case?
A.

Substantive Background to the Tax Issue

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, the Tenth Circuit
decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., discussed whether the tax imposed by 26 U.S.C.
§ 4980D is a "tax" provision within the meaning of the AntiInjunction Act (AIA)
In a nutshell, the Tenth Circuit noted that
Congress's use of the word "tax" created a "strong indication [that
it] intend[ed] the AIA to apply,1 2 3 but ultimately concluded that 26
U.S.C. § 4980D is a purely regulatory tax.124 Therefore, the panel

119. Id. at 2780.

120. Id. at 2782; see also Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 621-22
(7th Cir. 2015) (holding that, following Hobby Lobby, the opt-out provision did not
substantially burden religious organizations).
121. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781.
122. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1126-28 (10th Cir.
2013) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014).
123. Id. at 1127.

124. See id. ("The statutory scheme makes clear that the tax at issue here is no
more than a penalty for violating regulations related to health care and employerprovided insurance ....
").
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held, it was not subject to the AIA. 12'
As in NFIB,126 the
government never contended that the AIA should preempt a
merits analysis,1 7 and the Court only addressed the issue on the
assumption1 2that the AIA creates a general bar to subject matter
jurisdiction. 1
Though its method of analysis is instructive, the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that the tax codified in § 4980D is not a "tax"
for the purposes of the AIA is inapposite to the relevant inquiry
here: Whether or not the tax codified in § 4980D is a "tax" for the
purposes of RFRA. At first, this question seems somewhat obtuse.
Unlike the AIA, 12 9 the statutory language codifying RFRA does not
13
use the term "tax,""
and neither did the underlying session law
passed by Congress.131 Additionally, neither the codified nor the
session-law version of RFRA refers to non-tax "penalties. ' 12 Thus,
one could quite reasonably argue that Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius's1 3 and NFIB's respective determinations of whether 26
U.S.C. §§ 4980D and 5000A(a)-(b) are "taxes" were a necessary

125. Id. at 1127-28; see also id. at 1152-59 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing
that the AlA created a waivable defense for the government, rather than a
jurisdictional limit on a court). Perhaps the most remarkable portion of Judge
Gorsuch's concurrence, joined by Judges Kelly and Tymkovich, is his statement
that Hobby Lobby's "claim in this case closely parallels claims the Supreme Court
vindicated in Thomas and Lee." Id. at 1153. Judge Gorsuch then discussed Lee's
contention, accepted by the Supreme Court, that the government could not contest
the religious merits of Lee's objection to Social Security because "[i]t is not within
'the judicial function and judicial competence,' . . . to determine whether appellee or
the Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith." Id. (citing
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Indep. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981))). Thus, perhaps in using the word
"case," Judge Gorsuch meant something like "aspect." Still, in grouping Lee with
both Thomas and his opinion in Hobby Lobby, Judge Gorsuch inadvertently
highlighted the apparent discrepancy between the Court's present religious
freedom jurisprudence and its holding in Lee.
126. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
127. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1128.
128. See id. at 1127.
129. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2012).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
131. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-1041, 107
Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012)).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; 107 Stat. at 1488-90.
133. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1126.
134. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012).
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function of the AIA's statutory interpretation, 135 but that such an
inquiry is asinine where a law makes no use of such formalist
categories.
However, if there is no cognizable category of "tax cases"
within the canon of free-exercise and RFRA precedents, it becomes
difficult to ascertain the meaning of Justice Ginsburg's statements
that Lee "was a tax case" 136 but that "the Lee Court made two key
points one cannot confine to tax cases, '' 13 or to make sense of her
assertion that the majority holding would apply to every law
"saving only tax laws. 1 3' This contradiction might be resolved if
Justice Ginsburg's characterization of the majority was without
basis. However, that does not seem to be the case. While Justice
Alito rejected the theory that his opinion enabled "commercial
enterprises ... [to] 'opt out of any law (saving only tax laws),"' it
was on the grounds that Hobby Lobby would be more narrowly
applied than the dissent feared; he did not suggest that Hobby
Lobby could affirmatively impact tax laws.13 9 Furthermore, as a
means to distinguish Hobby Lobby from Lee, Justice Alito pointed
out that the latter "turned primarily on the special problems
associated with a national system of taxation, 1 41 suggesting that
the contraceptive mandate creates no such national system.
However, even assuming that there is some basis for a dichotomy
between tax and non-tax provisions with respect to RFRA claims,
Hobby Lobby's attempt to distinguish its facts from "tax cases"
(such as Lee and Adams) is dubious because, per NFIB, the
contraceptive mandate is itself a tax provision.
B.

The ContraceptiveMandate as a Tax Provision

The argument that 28 U.S.C. § 4980D ought to be interpreted
as a tax provision is a relatively straightforward one. RFRA and
the ACA "are creatures of Congress's own creation," and, therefore,
the legally correct understanding of the relationship between the

135. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom
and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 273 (1995) ("Congress did not exempt the
tax code from RFRA. Congress did not exempt the Social Security Act from
RFRA.... Congress, by failing to exclude given programs or policies from RFRA,
has implicitly conceded that none of those interests is categorically 'compelling."').
136. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2804 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (implying that the remainder of Lee's holding can be confined to "tax
cases").
138. Id. at 2787.
139. See id. at 2760 (majority opinion).
140. Id. at 2784.
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two is determined by Congressional intent. 141 Congress chose to
categorize § 4980D as a tax.142 That alone is significant, because
other provisions in the ACA are labeled as "penalties," rather than
"taxes., 143 "Where Congress uses certain language in one part of a
statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed
Congress acts intentionally., 144 This simple canon provides the
legal basis for theory that, generally speaking, § 4980D ought to be
classified as a "tax" when interpreting other congressional
145
statutes.
Of course, the specific content of 1 the
aforementioned
46
statutes might undermine such a classification.
The counterargument to this assertion would likely mimic
the Tenth Circuit's discussion of the AIA. 141 Its decision in Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius contended that § 4980D is not
actually a tax, but rather "no more than a penalty for violating
regulations related to health care and employer-provided
insurance ....,,14 To demonstrate the contraceptive mandate's
punitive nature, the Tenth Circuit compared the monetary
equivalence of § 4980D's provisions and "the maximum 'penalty'
that the Secretary of HHS can impose on non-compliant
insurers.'141
It further compared the "tax" that providing
employers would pay for refusing to cover the instant
contraception, about $475 million per year, to the "tax" that
employers would pay for dropping health care coverage entirely,
about $26 million per year. 150 Additionally, the court noted: "[A]
regulatory tax is just one of many collateral consequences that can
result from a failure to comply with the contraceptive-coverage
requirement." 51 1 Echoing the arguments in NFIB, one might

141. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012).
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 4980D (2012).
143. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
144. Id. at 2583 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
145. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1127 (10th Cir.
2013) (en banc) (stating that Congress's use of the word "tax" created a strong
presumption in favor of applying the AlA to the measure), aff'd sub nom.Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
146. See id. (holding that the specifics of the AlA rebutted that presumption).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(b)(2)(C)(i)).
150. Id. at 1141; see also id. at 1125 (describing the provision, consistent with
Congress's designation but inconsistent with NFIB, as a "penalty").
151. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(92) (2012); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1127 (citing
29 U.S.C § 1132(a)(5) (2012)).
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contend that the "tax" imposed by § 4980D is too obviously a
regulatory, punitive mechanism to qualify as a "tax" for the
purposes of statutory interpretation. 152
The response to such an argument is that pure formalism
controls here and that the actual function of § 4980D does not
matter. NFIB expressly demonstrates that, with respect to other
statutes, the Court should construe such provisions as "taxes"
according to Congress's designation-even when that designation
is substantively erroneous.153 By engaging in a functionalist
inquiry as to whether or not § 4980D really is a "penalty," the
Tenth Circuit came close to ignoring the controlling opinion in
NFIB in favor of its dissent, which contended that the AIA
analysis was "more appropriately addressed in the significant
constitutional context of whether it is an exercise of Congress's
taxing power., 15 4 Indeed, the analytical crucible applied by the
Tenth Circuit, whether the provision was essentially punitive or
revenue-raising in purpose, was used in NFIB for constitutional
analysis, but expressly not for statutory interpretation.1 5 6 Still, in
fairness to the Tenth Circuit, the specific provisions of the AIA
invite a functionalist analysis. 517' But even so, that analysis says
that the AIA is an exception to the general rule, whereas RFRA,
which contains no such qualifications as to "taxes,"15 ought to be
interpreted solely in terms of implied and explicit congressional
intent. 159

152. Compare Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012)
("In distinguishing penalties from taxes, this Court has explained that 'if the
concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or
omission."'), with Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1127 ("The statutory scheme makes
clear that the tax at issue here is not more than a penalty for violating
regulations .... ").
But see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (stating that functional
analysis is appropriate for constitutional purposes, whereas formalist analysis is
appropriate for statutory interpretation).
153. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922)) (discussing the application of the AIA to the litigation
flowing from the Child Labor Tax Law, even after that law was ruled to exceed
Congress's authority under the taxing power).
154. Id. at 2656 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1127.
156. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583; id. at 2595-97.
157. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2012); see also Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717,
727 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[The AIA] requires a careful inquiry into the remedy sought,
the statutory basis for that remedy, and any implication the remedy may have on
assessment and collection."); Robertson v. United States, 582 F.3d 1126, 1127-28
(7th Cir. 1978) (ruling that the AIA does not apply to "purely regulatory taxies]").
158. See Paulsen, supra note 135, at 273.
159. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583; id. at 2595-97.

Why We Can't Be Friends

2016]

That Lee was decided on constitutional grounds, rather than
according to RFRA, might mean that Lee is a "tax case" in a
discrete category that Hobby Lobby cannot be.16° Undoubtedly,
Social Security and income taxes fall within NFIB's boundaries of
the taxing power,161 whereas the constitutional basis for the
contraceptive mandate is far less certain.1 2 However, as explained
in detail below,1"3 RFRA collapses the relevance of any such
distinctions. 16 4
RFRA "applies to all Federal law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993 .... Federal
statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993, is subject to this
16
chapter unless such law explicitly excludes such application., 1
Congress has not authorized such an exception to either the Social
Security Act 166 or the income tax code. 16 7 Therefore, while Lee itself
is not subject to RFRA, the statutory provisions at issue in Lee, as
well as in Adams, are subject to RFRA16 '
Furthermore, as
Congress designated Social Security contributions, 16 9 income
taxes,17 9 and § 4980D liabilities as "taxes," so too are they "taxes"
for the purposes of RFRA. Thus, to the extent Adams was a "tax
case" for RFRA analysis, it follows that Hobby Lobby was as well.
C. The Ultimate Insignificance of the Tax Issue
In demonstrating that Hobby Lobby is itself a "tax case," the
method of statutory interpretation mandated by NFIB undermines
Justice Ginsburg's categorical assertions that Lee's holding could
be largely confined to tax cases1 1 and that Hobby Lobby's holding
would not apply to "tax laws., 112 To Quaker tax resisters, such
recognition begs a delicious question: In holding that RFRA

160. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014)
(noting that Lee was decided under free exercise).
161. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595-97.

162. See id.
163. See infra Part IV.C.
164. See Paulsen, supra note 135, at 273.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)-(b) (2012).

166. See Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 1999).
167. See Miller v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 511, 517-18 (2000).
168. See Paulsen, supra note 135, at 273 (noting that "Congress did not exempt"
the Social Security Act or income tax from RFRA).
169. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S 252 (1982) (referring to Social Security
collection as a "tax").
170. See Adams, 170 F.3d at 179.

171. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2787.

Ct. 2751, 2804 (2014)
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compelled the non-enforcement of a specific tax provision
(§ 4980D), did the Hobby Lobby court suggest that RFRA can
compel the non-enforcement of tax provisions in general? Such an
argument takes the form of the following syllogism: (1) In Hobby
Lobby, the Court ruled that RFRA means free-exercise objections
trumped the statutory duty to comply with § 4890D; (2) section
4890D is a tax provision for the purposes of RFRA; (3) Social
Security and the income tax are tax provisions for the purposes of
RFRA; and (4) RFRA means that free-exercise objections trump
the statutory duty to comply with Social Security and income
taxes. The problem with such a view is that it depends on the
same faulty premise as its converse: Justice Ginsburg's and, to a
lesser extent, Justice Alito's view that RFRA makes a distinction
between "tax" and
"non-tax" cases. 17 3 In reality, RFRA makes no
174
such distinction.
As initially passed, RFRA applied to all previous and
subsequent federal and state laws, except for those laws explicitly
exempted.1 7 1 While the Supreme Court ruled in City of Boerne v.
Flores that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the states,
RFRA still occupies a superior position relative to every other
federal law, save the laws into which Congress has inserted a
statutory exemption.17 6 This is the only distinction contemplated
by the law.1 77 The reason Hobby Lobby may impact litigation with
facts analogous to those in Lee and Adams is not because each case
concerned "tax provisions," but rather because each case concerned
federal laws lacking statutory exemptions for the accommodation
of religious exercise.
In terms of legal formalism, Hobby Lobby
has no greater relevance for tax laws than for any other federal
law.
Thus, the tax issue ultimately reveals itself as a cypher. One
cannot plausibly argue that Hobby Lobby has a special significance
for tax laws. But the legal logic undermining that argument cuts
both ways. If a statutory provision's classification as a "tax" is
non-dispositive--or even irrelevant-in the analysis of whether
the provision violates RFRA, then Justices Alito and Ginsburg
173. See id. at 2787; id. at 2784 (majority opinion).
174. See RFRA 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)-(b) (2012).
175. Id. § 2000bb-3(a).
176. See id. § 2000bb-3(a)-(b); see also Paulsen, supra note 135, at 283-84
(emphasizing RFRA's superiority as a "super statute").
177. See RFRA § 2000bb 3(a)-(b).
178. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980D (2012); cf. Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173, 179 (2d
Cir. 1999) (indicating that RFRA exempts neither Social-Security nor income
taxes).
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have no basis in legal formalism for insulating "tax cases" such as
Lee, Adams, Yearly Meeting I, and Yearly Meeting II from the
effects of the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, even assuming that
26 U.S.C. § 4890 is a punitive, non-tax penalty.
Hobby Lobby represents the Court's most recent analysis of
RFRA. And, as a pure matter of statutory hierarchy, RFRA
trumps the ACA, the Social Security Act, and the income tax
statutes alike. 179
The majority's generalized claim that
''recognizing religious objections to particular expenditures from
general tax revenues" would "threaten the viability" of any general
tax provision's statutory scheme18 9 does not recognize the commonlaw segregation of "tax cases." Rather, common-law tax cases
merely represent a recurring obstacle to proving that the
government's burdening action is not the "least restrictive means"
to achieve a compelling state interest.""
Though much of the foregoing analysis might now seem
pointlessly academic, it is illustrative of a subtle point: A lower
court hearing a case similar to Lee might read Hobby Lobby as
18 2
implying that Lee stands isolated from and unmodified by RFRA.
However, it would be an error for that court to follow Adams and
dismiss the case with a pithy citation to Lee due to its belief that
Social Security and income tax provisions are (still) categorically
beyond RFRA's impact."
Instead, the court would need to engage
in a case-by-case analysis weighing the modified Sherbert
factors. 14 RFRA demands nothing less.

179. Paulsen, supra note 135, at 283-84.

180. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2784 (2014). But see
id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's interpretation of the
common-law segregation of "tax cases").
181. See id.
182. See Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he nature of the
compelling interest involved-as characterized by the Supreme Court in Leeconverts the least restrictive means inquiry into a rhetorical question that has been
answered by the analysis in Lee.").
183. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784; see also id. at 2784 n.43 (indicating
that RFRA abrogated Lee in part).
184. See, e.g., id. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("RFRA's purpose is specific
and written into the statute itself. The Act was crafted to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert .... ").

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 34:183

V. Lifting the Veil: A "Post-Tax Case" Reading of Lee and
Adams
A.

The Supreme Court'sAlternative Theories for
DistinguishingHobby Lobby

Perhaps
acknowledging
the
previously
discussed
nonexistence of a legal basis for distinguishing Lee as a "tax case,"
in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito repeatedly reminded his readers
that Lee concerned free exercise, rather than RFRA.185 Of course, a
contemporary Lee analogue would be decided under RFRA, so the
majority continues, "our holding in Lee turned primarily on the
'
special problems associated with a national system of taxation."186
As previously discussed, one cannot meaningfully interpret this
statement as a per se rule that RFRA cannot compel exceptions to
national systems of taxation."7 After all, under a formalist view,
the contraceptive mandate is one such system."' Rather, Hobby
Lobby must mean that the specific tax at issue in Lee-Social
Security-requires uniform participation in order to effect the
underlying compelling government interest. 9
Oddly, Justice Alito did not discuss the Social Security
system, but instead borrowed from Lee's analogy to the income tax:
"Because of the enormous variety of government expenditures
funded by tax dollars, allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion of
their tax obligations on religious grounds would lead to chaos."' 9°
The majority then pointed to a purportedly crucial distinction
between the income tax and the contraceptive mandate: The
contraceptive mandate does not create a single pool of funds in
order to provide healthcare coverage. 91 According to Justice Alito,
because employers fund plans directly rather than through a
national system, the viability of the ACA, unlike that of the
19 2
income tax, is not threatened by religious accommodation.
However, Justice Ginsburg pointed to Lee to support the
proposition that an employer's voluntary entry into the world of
commerce renders his or her beliefs subject to statutory schemes
governing that activity, and that the Court should not recognize

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id. at 2784 n.43 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2784.
See supra Part III.C.
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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religious exemptions that "operat[e] to impose [an] employer's
'
religious faith on [his or her] employees."193
Nevertheless, like the
majority, the dissent viewed Lee as indicative of a baseline for
religious freedom-specifically, one beyond which the federal
government is no longer able to function."'
The Supreme Court's fractured consensus does not reflect
judicial unanimity that the underlying factual circumstances in
Lee and Hobby Lobby easily distinguish the two cases. In Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, the Tenth Circuit held:
Hobby Lobby and Mardel stand in essentially the same
position as the Amish carpenter in Lee, who objected to being
forced to pay into a system that enables someone else to
behave in a manner he considered immoral. That is precisely
the objection of Hobby Lobby .... 95
Despite his own efforts to preserve Lee, Justice Alito admits that
the portion of Lee's holding concerning the superimposition of
commercial actors' personal beliefs upon the statutory scheme
governing
others in that activity is "squarely inconsistent with"
19 6
RFRA
B. Applying a Hobby Lobby Analysis to Lee
1.

General Equivalence of the Cases

It is telling that, when purporting to examine the application
of RFRA to the facts in Lee, the majority discussed the income tax
rather than Social Security. 9 The factors considered by the Court
in determining whether the contraceptive mandate was the "least
restrictive means" map closely to those that would have to be
considered for a contemporary rehearing of Lee.19 In other words,
the same reasoning used by the Court in Hobby Lobby would
compel a resolution for the plaintiff in Lee.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out: "Congress amended the
Social Security Act in response to Lee" so as to allow "Amish sole
proprietorships
and partnerships
(but not Amish-owned
193. See id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 2805-06. Of course, unlike the majority, the dissent views Hobby
Lobby as compromising that baseline. See id.
195. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013)
(en banc), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014); see also id. at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
196. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784 n.43.
197. See id. at 2784 ("The obligation to pay the social security tax initially is not
fundamentally different from the obligation to pay income taxes." (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1981))).
198. See id.
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corporations)" to opt out of Social Security taxes and benefits for
co-religionist employees "who likewise seek an exemption and
'
agree to give up their Social Security benefits."199
Thus, there are
three foreseeable plaintiffs for contemporary litigation analogous
to Lee:
(1) Amish-owned closely held corporations seeking
permission to opt into the expanded exemption under RFRA; (2)
Amish employers seeking to apply the exemption to all of their
employees, regardless of employee consent; and (3) plaintiffs
seeking both.
Each of these plaintiffs would be identically situated to those
in Hobby Lobby with respect to the essential points of that
decision. First, there is no legal basis for categorically excluding
Amish-owned closely held corporations, as Hobby Lobby
definitively held that closely held corporations can exercise
200
religious beliefs and that such beliefs are protected by RFRA.
Furthermore, Hobby Lobby makes clear that any non-consenting
employee's statutory rights to his or her Social Security benefits
are subordinate to his or her employer's "super-statutory" rights
under RFRA. 20 1 Although the majority opinion cited Cutter v.
Wilkinson to concede that "courts must take adequate account of
the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries, 202° it then arguably removed the teeth from that
principle by ruling that, because the government might re-describe
any burdening activity as a benefit to third parties, RFRA's
prohibition on undermining third-party rights is not absolute.0 3
This, in turn, gives the court ample leeway to decide which thirdparty benefits are real and which are products of government
sophistry in the ensuing "compelling interest" and "restrictive
means" inquiries.0 4 Assuming sincerity of belief and substantial
burdening, the government would have no recourse to dispute the
theological validity of a plaintiffs categorical opposition to Social

199. See id. at 2804 n.29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 2767-74 (majority opinion).

201. See id. at 2784 n.43 ("Under RFRA, when followers of a particular religion
choose to enter into commercial activity, the Government does not have a free hand
in imposing obligations that substantially burden their exercise of religion."). The
majority never discussed the legal significance of the consent of those employees
whose statutory right to birth control was at issue. Id. at 2759-85.
202. Id. at 2781 n.37 (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)).
203. See id.
204. See id.
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Security. 2°5
The only remaining issues, then, are the
determinations of:
(1) the precise "government interest"
contemplated in and challenged by the suit, and (2) whether the
government's challenged policy is the "least restrictive" means of
effecting that goal.
2.

Compelling Government Interest

Read narrowly, the majority opinion in Lee characterized the
government interest at issue as the "assuran[ce ofl mandatory and
continuous participation in and contribution to the social security
system. 2 °6 However, Lee itself concerned the availability of a
statutory exemption to the usually mandatory Social Security
rules. 2 17 Hobby Lobby suggests that the continued tolerated
existence of exemptions undermines the possibility that the
government has a compelling interest in the uniform enforcement
of a statute.
Another possibility is that the Lee Court may have also
considered the balance Congress struck between religious freedom
and Social Security functionality to allow certain Amish, but not
others, to opt into the Social Security exemption. 9 Under this
view, Congress's decision to cap a statutory opt-out provision at a
certain point implies that a compelling interest exists in limiting
the availability of the provision beyond said point. 10
Stated
differently, there was "a 'compelling interest' in the uniform
application of [the Social Security] scheme simply because that
[was] the way Congress drafted the statute., 21' Though this may
well have been the compelling interest the Court contemplated in
Lee, Hobby Lobby makes clear that equivalent interests are no

205. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (stating that it is "not within
'the judicial function and judicial competence" to determine the proper
interpretation of religious beliefs (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Emp't
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981))).
206. Id. at 251-52.
207. Id. at 260-61.

208. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (discussing the existence of
grandfathered" health-care plans that provide no contraceptive coverage).
209. See Paulsen, supra note 135, at 272-73; see also Lee, 455 U.S. at 259

("[B]alance must be struck between the values of the comprehensive social security
system, which rests on a complex of actuarial factors, and the consequences of
allowing religiously based exemptions. To maintain an organized society that
guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some
religious practices yield to the common good.").
210. See Paulsen, supra note 135, at 272-73.
211. Id. at 272.
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longer available.212 There, the Court assumed that "guaranteeing
cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods" was
a compelling interest. 13 The fact that Congress had balanced the
religious freedoms of certain employers against financial realities
in a specific way (by carving out an exemption for religious
nonprofits but not for closely held for-profit corporations) did not
create a compelling
interest in the policy of excluding closely held
14
corporations.
Instead, the Hobby Lobby Court assumed that there was a
compelling interest in the targeted policy outcome of the statutes:
cost-free access to the challenged contraceptives. Whereas the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),"1 ' Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, 16 and subsequent decisions 17 have
characterized the government interest as comprised of broad policy
outcomes, this conception of "compelling interest" was rejected by
the Hobby Lobby majority, which suggested that when identifying
compelling interests, courts must apply a "focused inquiry [that]
requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling
interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law
to the ...

particular claimant."1 '

In other words, the compelling

interest must be achieved not just by the program as a whole, but
by the application of the burdening activity to the claimant in the
instant case. Thus, per Hobby Lobby, in a case with facts
analogous to Lee, the compelling interest considered by a court
would be something similar to an interest in providing late-life
funds to the employers challenging the law, as well as to their
employees.219 Of course, as seen in Hobby Lobby, this outcome-

212. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782-83 (affording no deference to
Congress's and HRSA's decisions not to allow closely held for-profit corporations to
exempt themselves from the contraceptive mandate per 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)).
213. Id. at 2781.
214. See id. at 2782-83.

215. Id. at 2779 (identifying the policy interests behind the contraceptive
mandate as "public health" and "gender equality").
216. Id. at 2785-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Government's compelling
interest in providing insurance coverage [is] to protect the health of female
employees ....
").
217. See, e.g., Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 772
F.3d 229, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("The government contends that the regulations are
amply supported because they arise at the intersection of overlapping
governmental interests, each of which is compelling: public health, and women's
well-being.").
218. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.

219. See id.
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driven approach has the effect of granting courts broad leeway to
determine whether the government could find a "less restrictive
means" to accomplish its ends.
3.

Least Restrictive Means

According to the Hobby Lobby Court, the government failed
to demonstrate that the punitive mechanism in § 4980D was the
least restrictive means to guarantee free access to the challenged
birth control.220
In so doing, the Court looked for possible
alternatives to accomplish the compelling interest.22 1 In its dicta
discussing Lee, the Court stated that allowing religious-freedom
exceptions of any sort to Social Security would eviscerate the
government interest therein.
But the facts of Lee are much
closer to those of Hobby Lobby than the majority let on.
Examining Lee under RFRA, the Hobby Lobby majority held
that "the fundamental point would be that there simply is no less
restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes,"
suggesting that this categorical imperative necessarily overrides
any religious objections.2 3 However, that cannot possibly be the
case, because Social Security exemptions existed at the time of
Lee's decision and have been subsequently expanded within a
tolerable margin. 224 These exceptions and exemptions to Social
Security belie the fact that, in practice, there is no "categorical
requirement to pay [identical] taxes., 2 1 Indeed, the Court's logic
here only makes sense if the "compelling interest" is of the sort
that, in Hobby Lobby, it recognized RFRA as superseding. The
Hobby Lobby dissent had a subtly different test, requiring the
government to demonstrate only that there is "no less restrictive,
equally effective means" of accomplishing the contemplated

220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 2780-81.
See id. at 2781-82.
Id. at 2784.
Id.

224. See id. at 2804 n.29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing Congress's
subsequent expansion of the Social Security exemption at issue in Lee).
225. See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 621 (7th Cir. 2015)
(Hamilton, J., concurring) ("We have a long tradition of governing in ways that
accommodate the free exercise of religion ....From conscientious objector status in
the military draft to federal and state tax codes .. .our governments at every level
have long made room for religious faith by allowing exceptions from generally
applicable laws."). But see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784 (stating that RFRA
does not mandate religious accommodations for income taxation).
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226

interest.
But, perhaps because it risks swallowing RFRA's
unique super-statutory application,
this is not the test expressly
27
adopted by the majority.
Thus, were a Lee analogue to come before a court, Hobby
Lobby suggests the court would need to consider any plausible
alternative means for the government to achieve its narrowly
defined policy goal: providing late-life funds to both the employers
challenging the law and to their employees. Congress could
ameliorate this problem by requiring exempted employers to
personally guarantee the difference in lost benefits to employees
who do not consent to opting out of Social Security, and/or by
authorizing the IRS or Social Security Administration to
periodically audit a privately held account designated to accrue
funds for private payments to employees in lieu of Social
22
Security.
'
True, this system might not be as effective as the
current Social Security System. But HHS plausibly contended in
Hobby Lobby that allowing privately held businesses to opt out of
the mandate and expanding the red tape associated with the
supplementary
government 229contraceptives
threatened to
undermine contraceptive access.
Yet the Court rejected this notion, essentially assuming that
the government-run supplementary system would be as efficiently
run and that all employers would comply with their attendant
duties to "provid[e] information and coverage. 30 Similarly, the
exemption for Amish sole proprietorships and partneships,231
which has continuously accommodated Amish business owners
without apparent incident, shows that the expansion of that
exemption, more so than the new, "untested" Hobby Lobby
exemption, is worthy of the benefit of the Court's doubt. In any

226. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also id. at 2792-93 (contending that the compelling interest test
imposed by RFRA is not stricter than the free-exercise compelling-interest test in
the Sherbert line of cases).
227. See id. at 2767-68 (majority opinion) (construing RFRA to go "far beyond"
free-exercise protections).
228. Cf. id. at 2781 (suggesting that RFRA can require the legislature to modify
an existing program or to create an entirely new program).
229. See id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at 2782-83 (majority opinion).
231. 26 U.S.C. § 3127(2012).

232. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2015).
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case, Hobby Lobby interpreted RFRA to require the government to
affirmatively prove that "plausible" alternative means,
such as any
23 3
of the alternatives proposed here, are not possible.
Finally, the Lee Court expressed grave concern that Social
Security could not withstand a de facto transformation into a
voluntary system. 234 But this criterion only makes sense in the
context of the generalized, broad policy goals that the Hobby Lobby
majority foreclosed from consideration in the "focused inquiry" of
RFRA analysis. 23 1 Furthermore, it is unlikely that enough
employers have sincere religious objections to Social Security such
that the broader system's integrity would be threatened. 6
However, even if such concerns are fair game, whether or not the
accommodation sought would threaten Social Security would need
to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, and the burden of proof
would be on the government.23 Assuming the government would
not be able to satisfy that burden, after Hobby Lobby, it strains
reason to think that RFRA does not protect a modern-day Edwin
Lee's right
to withdraw himself and his employees from Social
23
Security. 1
C. Applying a Hobby Lobby Analysis to Adams
1.

Compelling Interest

Even if Hobby Lobby effectively vitiated Lee's proscription on
religious-freedom objections to Social Security taxation, it does not
automatically follow that it had the same effect upon religiousfreedom objections to income taxation. The income tax code is
vastly more complex than the Social Security Act 239 and the

233. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
234. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982).

235. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
236. See id. at 2774 (stating that sincerity, though not disputed in the instant
case, is a relevant part of RFRA inquiry); see also Paulsen, supra note 135, at 278
(arguing that administrative burdens do not rise to the level of compelling interests
unless the burdens themselves threaten the viability of some other "paramount
interest").
237. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781-83 (holding that the government failed
to demonstrate that proposed accommodations to its statutory scheme would not
work). However, the Court did not rule on whether the plaintiffs successfully
demonstrated that such accommodations would work. Id.
238. See id.
239. Compare 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1400U-3 (tax code), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397mm

(2012) (Social Security Act). For additional comparison, see CSX Corp. v. United
States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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federal government's interests and means in administering the
income tax
are different from those in administering Social
40
Security.
However, as foreshadowed by Chief Justice Burger s 241 and
Justice Alito's2 4 analogies between the Social Security Act and
income tax laws, the analysis is fundamentally the same. There is
no doubt-and indeed, courts have held-that income tax
incidentally but substantially burdens Quakers' sincerely held
religious beliefs. 2 43 And, as with Social Security, 44 Congress has
not designated the income tax as exempt from RFRA.14' Therefore,
taxing Quakers and using those receipts to finance "any and all
outward wars and strife2 46 is only permissible if the government
has a compelling interest in doing so, and it accomplishes that
interest by the least restrictive means available.
The government cannot meaningfully argue that it has a
compelling interest in the uniform collection of taxes when the tax
code is riddled with so many exemptions and exceptions that tax
receipts are literally individualized. 41 So too with Social Security.
Further, there is nothing specifically compelling about the
particular constellation of statutes and federal regulations that
comprise the tax code and the IRS's collection mechanisms. 49
Instead, when such cases arise, the government will have to assert
a compelling interest in the policy outcome contemplated by
income tax law as narrowly applied to the "particular claimant"

240. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (stating that the
difference between Social Security tax and income tax is that "social security tax
revenues are segregated for use only in furtherance of the statutory program"). But
see id. ("There is no principled way, however, for purposes of this case, to
distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security
Act.").
241. See id.
242. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784 ("The obligation to pay the social
security tax initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay
income taxes." (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 260)).
243. E.g., Yearly Meeting II, 322 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608-09 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("The
record demonstrates that the levy on Ms. Adams's wages substantially burdened
the Yearly Meeting's exercise of religion within the meaning of RFRA.").
244. See Miller v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 511, 517-18 (2000).
245. See Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 1999).
246. See Brief for New York Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Packard v. United States, No. 991391 (U.S. 2000), 2000 WL 34015023.
247. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
248. Cf. Miller, 114 T.C. at 516-19 (discussing the importance of assigning
individual Social Security Numbers in order to uniformly implement the federal tax
system).
249. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782-83.
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challenging the law.50 In this case, the compelling interest would
be the ability of the federal government to use the tax receipts of
the burdened individual to finance his or her share of its liabilities
and appropriations. 21 The only remaining question would be
whether this goal could be accomplished by a means other than
using Quakers' tax receipts to finance violent activities.
2.

Least Restrictive Means

The answer to that question is straightforward. There may
be no "less restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to
pay taxes,2 5 but there is no categorical requirement to pay the
same taxes. In Adams, the Third Circuit held: "The least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest in the
collection of taxes ... is in fact, to implement that system in a
uniform, mandatory way, with Congress determining in the first
2 3
instance if exemptions are.., built into the legislative scheme.
The Supreme Court expressly rejected that reasoning in ruling
that courts can, where applicable, interpret RFRA to require
Congress to create new programs.2 5 4 If, under RFRA, courts do not
need to defer to Congress's decision not to accommodate certain
religious objections to laws of general applicability, Hobby Lobby
frees courts to play the role of legislator and to determine whether
any other policy might afford an accommodation.
Thus, there is no clear reason why a federal court should not
rule that RFRA requires Congress to authorize the Peace Tax
Fund, or something similar. The most recent Peace Tax Fund
proposal 255 likely would not affect the federal government's ability
to allocate funds.2 56 And because Hobby Lobby placed the burden
of proof on the government,
the government would have to
demonstrate that the proposal would hinder its ability to allocate
funds. Thus, it was bizarre for the Court to imply that the income

250. See id. at 2779.

251. See id.
252. Id. at 2784.

253. Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
254. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780; see also Paulsen, supra note 135, at
272-73 (arguing that, following RFRA, the government does not have a compelling
interest in a particular set of exemptions just because Congress arrived upon that
set).

255. See H.R. 2483, 113th Cong. (2013).
256. It would only affect the government's ability to allocate funds if the total
budget for "impermissible uses" exceeded the sum of the gross of tax receipts of
those who did not opt into the Peace Tax Fund.
257. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
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tax is insulated from RFRA claims. The Court's view that, in light
of the many possible expenditures of income tax, "allowing
taxpayers to withhold a portion of their tax obligations on religious
2 8
grounds would lead to chaos,""
contradicts Hobby Lobby's
requirement that compelling interests be cognized in terms of the
"application of the challenged law to... the particular
claimant.""9 So, just as the Hobby Lobby majority required the
government to prove that it could not afford to directly provide the
challenged contraceptives to the effected women, a court operating
in Hobby Lobby's wake ought to require the government to prove
that it cannot afford to establish and administer the Peace Tax
Fund.
Conclusion: Compelling State Interests, but Compelling to
Whom?
Under Hobby Lobby, the government must prove that there is
no possible "less restrictive" alternative to the statutory scheme
challenged in a RFRA claim-even if such an alternative would be
less effective at achieving the government's interest than the
challenged federal law. 6 9 However, the most striking thing about
Hobby Lobby is how the Court banally assumed as dicta that the
government will meet its burden when Social
Security and income
61
tax provisions are challenged under RFRA
In his concurring opinion in University of Notre Dame v.
Burwell, decided after Hobby Lobby, Seventh Circuit Judge David
Hamilton emphasized the importance of religious accommodation
in the American democratic scheme:
Any student of United States history learns the central roles
that religious faith and tolerance have played.., in the
founding of the British colonies and the modern States and the
federal Republic .... From conscientious objector status in the
military draft to federal and state tax codes, from compulsory
school attendance laws to school lunch menus, from zoning
law to employment law and even fish and wildlife rules, our
governments at every level have long made room for religious
faith by allowing exceptions from generally applicable laws.
Through such exceptions and accommodations, we respect
diverse faiths, and we govern with reasonable compromises
262
that avoid unnecessary friction between law and faith.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Univ.

2784.
2779 (emphasis added).
2781-83.
2784.
of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 621 (7th Cir. 2015)
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Here, Judge Hamilton reflected upon the broad, historical
application of the principle accepted by the Supreme Court that
"the Constitution ...affirmatively mandates accommodation, not
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any., 263 The fundamental question underlying this Note is why
this principle has not, and, in the current Court's view, cannot
apply to Quaker pacifism, even though RFRA supersedes all nonexempted federal statutes, tax and non-tax provisions alike. 264 It is
not clear why the Court appeared to definitively rule on the
extension of Hobby Lobby to theo-pacifist tax resistance when that
issue arose within the case and controversy only because HHS
made an analogy to Lee.26 ' That the Court overreached in Hobby
Lobby's dicta might not be so egregious if the majority's
conclusions within that dicta flowed from the fundamental logic of
the decision. However, as the above analysis demonstrates, the
two directly contradict each other. This begs the question of what,
if not legal logic, caused the Hobby Lobby majority (and, indeed,
the entire Court)266 to preemptively insulate Lee and Adams,
rather than allow for the possibility-or an argument on the
merits-that RFRA religious accommodation extends to the tax
system. One possible answer is as prosaic as it is taboo: political
considerations.
Social Security has long been called the "third rail of politics,"
implying that any measures taken to tinker with its fragile
formulation will result in the tinkerer's demise.267 At the other end
of that spectrum,
Quaker pacifists have
lobbied for
accommodations since the seventeenth century, and have been
rebuked since (at least) the nineteenth century.
In 2014, Social
Security and defense spending together constituted forty-two
percent of the federal budget, with $615 billion going to defense
spending alone.296 The contraceptive mandate, on the other hand,
was a component of one of the most controversial pieces of
(Hamilton, J., concurring).
263. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
264. See Paulsen, supra note 135, at 283-84.

265. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783-84.
266. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
267. See, e.g., Jared S. Childers, Touching the Third Rail: An Analysis of Social
Security and the Recently Revealed U.S.-Mexico Social Security Totalization
Agreement, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 227, 231-32 (2007) (explaining the criticisms

of and controversy surrounding the Social Security system).
268. Kornhauser, supra note 21, at 983.
269. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE DO OUR
FEDERAL TAX DOLLARS GO? 1 (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/

files/4-14-08tax.pdf.
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legislation in the nation's history and was passed at a time when
American women's access to healthcare-specifically, to birth
control-was rapidly declining.270 In lieu of any legal reasons why
Hobby Lobby is an aberration, the underlying controversies
surrounding the ACA and reproductive rights provide countless
271
political reasons why it is."
In theory, political considerations
should have no place in the Court's jurisprudence. Of course, it
would be naive to think Chief Justice Roberts came to his novel
conclusion in NFIB absent political calculation of any kind."' But
there, such reasoning was arguably tolerable under accepted
canons of constitutional interpretation. 3 However, as RFRA's
cheerleaders in the judiciary 4 and academia7 have made clear,
RFRA tolerates no such interpretations:
Absent express
exemption, the law operates uniformly. 76
Yet the Social Security Act and income tax laws are not the
only statutory provisions the Hobby Lobby majority sought to
insulate from its own holding.7
Indeed, despite the aggressive
application of RFRA to Hobby Lobby's facts, the Court went out of
its way to limit the opinion's breadth.7 Accordingly, perhaps the
so-called "tax cases" are not the odd exceptions to Hobby Lobby's
expansive holding, but Hobby Lobby is itself the exception to a
more timid general interpretation of RFRA's approach to
"compelling government interest."7 9 To wit, the same majority

270. See Saundra Young, White House Set To Reverse Health Care Conscience
Clause, CNN (Feb. 27, 2009, 5:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/27/
conscience.rollback/index.ht ml?eref=ib us.
271. See Steve Heilig, The Abortion Wars: Men Who Trust Women, HUFFINGTON

POST (Feb. 1, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-heilig/theabortion-wars b 4319839.html (discussing the ongoing culture war over birth
control).
272. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 97, at 337 ("Chief Justice Roberts established
key constitutional doctrine ... yet he did so in a politically diplomatic manner.").
273. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012)
(stating that the Court should afford acts of Congress a constitutional
interpretation so long as that interpretation was "fairly possible," even if it is not
the "natural" interpretation).
274. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1146 (10th
Cir. 2013) (en banc) ("Congress thus obligated itself to explicitly exempt laterenacted statutes from RFRA, which is conclusive evidence that RFRA trumps those
federal statutes when RFRA has been violated."), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
275. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 135, at 250-53 (explaining that RFRA is a
"super statute" that supersedes previously and subsequently enacted federal laws).
276. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1146.
277. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
278. Id. at 2760.
279. Id.
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opinion that disparaged HHS's putative compelling interests in
"public health" and "gender equality" as "couched in very broad
terms '280 went on to declare: "The Government has a compelling
interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the
workforce without regard to race. 281 Likewise, Justice Kennedy
suggested that Hobby Lobby may not apply to federal rules
requiring immunization because of the "interest [in] combat[ting]
the spread of infectious diseases. '
Is a governmental interest in
"women's health '2 3 or "gender equality ,2 4 really any more
amorphous than a categorical interest in an "equal opportunity to
participate in the workforce, 2 8 in "combatting ...diseases,
,,211

2

,,211

or

7

in having citizens "pay taxes"?
In theory, once the Court
assumes that there is a compelling government interest, those
compelling interests
ought to be treated equally under RFRA's
28
balancing test.
Any discussion of why the Justices approach the
government's interest in providing contraceptives, and subsequent
religious objections thereto, anomalously is inherently speculative
when compared to those interests listed above. However, there
may be an objective clue in the vocabulary used in the opinions
with respect to the value-or lack thereof-of the challenged
contraceptives.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence acknowledged
HHS's argument that the government had a compelling interest in
''providing insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the
health of female employees"; but, in his view, the Court assumed
only that the mandate furthered a "compelling interest in the
health of female employees. 2 9 Yet if the majority opinion actually

280. Id. at 2779.
281. Id. at 2783.
282. Id. at 2783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

283. Id. at 2788 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 2779 (majority opinion).
285. Id. at 2783.
286. Id. at 2783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
287. Id. at 2784.

288. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(guaranteeing equal protection under the law); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to the federal government via the Fifth Amendment). While I do not
contend the Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby decision violated the Fourteenth
Amendment per se, the Court's inconsistent approach to beneficiaries of different
government interests is, at minimum, contrary to the spirit of equal protection. See
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[N]o prior decision
under RFRA allows a religion-based exemption when the accommodation would
be harmful to others ....
").
289. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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made such an assumption, would it not have said so? Eschewing
even the slightest reference to the ACA's goal of ensuring that all
women have access to adequate healthcare, the majority assumed
only a compelling interest in "guaranteeing cost-free access to the
29
four challenged contraceptive methods.""
In light of Hobby
Lobby's internal contradictions, it seems unlikely that the majority
assumed even that much.

290. Id. at 2780.

